



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER

CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 894, 1 April 2011

Articles & Other Documents:

[Iran Jails Nuclear Scientist Shahram Amiri](#)

[Y-12 Seismically at Risk](#)

[UN Nuclear Agency Inspects Syria's Homs Site](#)

[Islamists Are Elated by Revolts, Cleric Says](#)

[Rep. Chung Calls for Redeployment of Tactical Nukes to S. Korea](#)

[Al Qaeda Declares South Yemen Province as "Islamic Emirate"](#)

[China Builds Higher Fences over Fears of Instability in North Korea](#)

[Pakistan in Nuclear Upswing](#)

[N. Korea Tells S. Korea to 'Choose Between War, Dialogue'](#)

[A Curious Pakistan Nuclear Policy](#)

[China Issues White Paper on National Defence](#)

[Libya Intervention Makes It Harder to Denuclearize N.Korea](#)

[China Sticks to No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons](#)

[Nukes In Europe: Coming Home Soon](#)

[Hundreds of Corpses Believed Irradiated, Inaccessible](#)

[The 'No First Use' of N-Weapons Debate](#)

[U.S., China Expand Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology](#)

[Indian Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defence Program – Analysis](#)

[White Paper on China's National Defence 2010](#)

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats and countermeasures. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at <http://cpc.au.af.mil/> for in-depth information and specific points of contact. The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved.

The Australian – Australia

Iran Jails Nuclear Scientist Shahram Amiri

By Hugh Tomlinson, *The Australian*

March 31, 2011

A NUCLEAR scientist at the centre of a spying row last year between Iran and the US has been jailed in Tehran and could face the death penalty.

Shahram Amiri, who returned to Iran in July after apparently defecting to the US, is under investigation for divulging secrets about Iran's clandestine uranium-enrichment program, *The Times* has learnt.

Sources inside Iran have confirmed Mr Amiri's arrest. If convicted of treason, he will almost certainly be executed.

The arrest adds a twist to this mysterious tale of claim and counterclaim. Mr Amiri, 33, was given a hero's welcome when he returned to Iran last year, with the regime claiming he had been a double agent leaking false information to the US.

The physicist vanished during a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia in June 2009. He had worked at Tehran's Malek Ashtar University, closely connected with the Revolutionary Guard and a centre for nuclear research.

US media reported he had defected in a long-planned CIA operation. Tehran accused Saudi intelligence of kidnapping Mr Amiri and handing him to the Americans. The CIA declined to comment. The operation blundered when US intelligence failed to extract Mr Amiri's wife and son to join him.

Angered by this betrayal, Mr Amiri reached out to Tehran in a series of bizarre videos released on YouTube and broadcast on Iranian state television. Sources in Tehran say his family was placed under enormous pressure, with the regime threatening to arrest his wife and kill his son.

Mr Amiri said in the videos he had been kidnapped and drugged by American and Saudi agents and smuggled to the US, where he had been tortured.

In July, he walked into the Iranian interests section of the Pakistani embassy in Washington and sought refuge, saying he was on the run from the CIA. In fact it is believed he was dropped off outside the building. US State Department officials dismissed his story as a "fairytale".

Mr Amiri was reunited with his family amid joyful scenes at Tehran airport, the regime claiming an intelligence coup over the US.

His arrest will test even Tehran's formidable powers of spin. Washington has also been embarrassed by the Amiri affair, concerned that the scientist's plight will damage efforts to persuade further officials to defect.

The Times

<http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/world/iran-jails-nuclear-scientist-shahram-amiri/story-e6frg6so-1226030965754>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Khaleej Times – U.A.E.

UN Nuclear Agency Inspects Syria's Homs Site

By Reuters

1 April 2011

VIENNA - The UN atomic watchdog carried out an agreed inspection of a Syrian plant on Friday as part of a long-stalled probe into suspected covert nuclear activity.

"The inspection is being conducted as planned," an official of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said, giving no further detail.

The visit to the Homs facility in western Syria was part of a wider IAEA inquiry into US intelligence suggesting Syria at another location tried to build a nuclear reactor suited to producing plutonium for atomic bombs.

Syria, which denies any nuclear weapons ambitions, agreed with the IAEA early last month that its inspectors could travel to the Homs acid purification plant, where uranium concentrates, or yellowcake, have been a by-product.

The IAEA saw it as a possible positive step, even though the United States said the gesture would not be enough to address allegations of covert atomic activity.

Letting inspectors only go to Homs would not satisfy Western concerns about Syria, which has stonewalled repeated IAEA requests for further access to a desert site seen as crucial to resolving the matter.

For over two years, Syria has refused IAEA follow-up access to the remains of a complex that was being built at Dair Alzour in the Syrian desert when Israel bombed it to rubble in 2007.

US intelligence reports said it was a nascent North Korean-designed nuclear reactor intended to produce bomb fuel. Inspectors found traces of uranium there in June 2008 that were not in Syria's declared nuclear inventory, heightening concerns.

Syria, an ally of Iran, whose nuclear programme is also under IAEA investigation, denies ever concealing work on nuclear weapons and says the IAEA should focus on Israel instead because of its undeclared nuclear arsenal.

Late last year, after repeated entreaties to Syria's nuclear agency went nowhere, IAEA Director-General Yukiya Amano appealed directly to its foreign minister for cooperation with his agency and access to Dair Alzour and other locations.

As part of its Syria probe, the IAEA has sought to examine the yellowcake at Homs, which if further processed could be used as nuclear fuel. Syria says the plant is for making fertilisers.

Enriched uranium can be used to run nuclear power plants, but also provide material for bombs, if refined much further.

During a 2004 visit to Homs inspectors observed hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake, a confidential IAEA report said.

http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?col=§ion=middleeast&xfile=data/middleeast/2011/April/middleeast_April8.xml

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News – South Korea

Rep. Chung Calls for Redeployment of Tactical Nukes to S. Korea

March 30, 2011

By Hwang Doo-hyong

WASHINGTON, March 29 (Yonhap) -- A senior South Korean lawmaker Tuesday called for redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea to pressure China to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear stockpile.

"The threat of a counter-nuclear force may be the only thing that will discourage North Korea from developing its nuclear arsenal," Rep. Chung Mong-joon, former chairman of the ruling Grand National Party, told a forum at the School of Advanced International Studies, at Johns Hopkins University. "It will force China to make the ultimate choice; to stay as the sole nuclear power in East Asia, or to let the entire region become nuclear."

China, North Korea's staunchest communist ally, has long been criticized for its lukewarm attitude toward North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, although it hosts the six-party talks on ending Pyongyang's nuclear weapons programs.

The nuclear talks involving the two Koreas, the U.S., China, Japan and Russia have been stalled for more than two years over U.N. sanctions for the North's nuclear and missile tests and the torpedoing of a South Korean warship and the shelling of a South Korean border island that killed 50 people last year.

"China seems unwilling to pressure North Korea to give up its nuclear program," Chung said. "It does not want North Korea to collapse, either. To make things worse, the U.S. seems to be exhausted from the endless and fruitless negotiations with North Korea. It is now perhaps willing to settle for non-proliferation rather than complete elimination of North Korean nuclear weapons."

Chung dismissed concerns that the redeployment "will only give North Korea the excuse to develop WMDs," saying, "North Korea is already a de facto nuclear power."

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said in January that North Korea's missiles and nuclear weapons will pose a threat to the U.S. within five years.

In November, the North Korean regime also disclosed a uranium enrichment plant that could be used to make nuclear weapons apart from its plutonium program. The North claims its intention is to generate electricity.

"Others argue that this will start an arms race in Northeast Asia," Chung said. "We have tried every mean at our disposal to denuclearize North Korea for the past 30 years. They have all failed. Maintaining the status quo is not an option. Now is the time to act."

The U.S. fears any redeployment of tactical nuclear warheads in South Korea or the South's nuclear armament will trigger a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia and undermine international efforts to denuclearize the North through the six-party talks.

The U.S. also maintains an agreement with South Korea that bans Seoul from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel.

Some South Korean conservatives have called for the redeployment of U.S. battlefield nuclear weapons or a nuclear-armed South Korea since North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009 and test-fired ballistic missiles.

U.S. officials have said they are not considering redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea.

"Our policy remains to support a non-nuclear Korean peninsula," James Miller, principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, said earlier this month. "The U.S. nuclear umbrella remains firmly over South Korea, and neither side believes that on peninsula, deployments are necessary to sustain that deterrent."

North Korea has periodically threatened to wage nuclear war and vowed to respond militarily to annual South Korean-U.S. military exercises.

The U.S. pulled all of its tactical nuclear weapons out of South Korea in 1991 as the two Koreas signed an agreement calling for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and inter-Korean rapprochement.

Washington since then has committed to providing so-called "extended deterrence," using all of the U.S. military might, including the nuclear umbrella and ballistic missiles, in defense of South Korea.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2011/03/30/52/0301000000AEN20110330000400315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Telegraph – U.K.

China Builds Higher Fences over Fears of Instability in North Korea

China is reinforcing fences and has stepped up patrols along its border with North Korea as fears mount of a catastrophic famine in the secretive Stalinist state.

By Peter Foster and agencies, Beijing
30 March 2011

Fences more than 13ft high, topped with barbed wire, are now being erected along an eight-mile stretch of the Yalu river around the Chinese city of Dandong. This is a popular escape point for North Korea refugees seeking food or better lives, Korea's Yonhap news agency reported.

"It's the first time such strong border fences are being erected here. Looks like it is related to the unstable situation in North Korea," a resident said of the work which began last November but is ongoing.

Previously the border was only marked by a 10ft-high fence which "anybody could cross if they really wanted", the resident added.

Fears for the stability of North Korea have been heightened in recent weeks with reports of a growing food crisis following the severest winter in 60 years and an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease that has hit the oxen that are still mainly used to plough the North's fields.

This week, in a highly unusual step, foreign aid agencies based in Pyongyang issued a joint statement warning that 6 million North Koreans now need urgent food aid because crops of potatoes, wheat and barley have all failed.

The groups, which include Save the Children and the Swiss government's relief agency, warn that already-malnourished North Koreans could face a total collapse in the North's food distribution system as early as May.

Earlier this month the UN's World Food Programme warned that the at-risk population urgently needed 475,000 tons of food, including cereals and soya beans, to increase protein in the diets, but warned of the risk of corruption in distribution channels.

North Korea experienced a widespread famine in the second half of the 1990s that is estimated to have killed up to a million of the country's 22m-strong population.

In the past North Korea has relied on massive food aid from South Korea – the so-called "sunshine policy" – but the aid has now stopped after attacks by North Korea soured relations between the two countries.

World Food Program officials briefed the South's government on Wednesday about the growing food needs in the North, however Seoul has made it clear that it will not resume aid to the North until Pyongyang takes responsibility for past attacks.

These also include the torpedoing of a North Korea warship, the Cheonan, last March with the loss of 46 South Korean sailors, an act which the North denies.

China has tried to urge North and South to restart stalled peace talks, warning that failure to negotiate with Pyongyang could destabilise North Korea, plunging the country into chaos and precipitating a flood of refugees across the border it is currently reinforcing.

However in a sign that Seoul intends to keep up the pressure on Pyongyang, its armed forces conducted live-fire exercises on Yeonpyeong, the same island where two marines and two civilians were killed in a North Korean artillery bombardment last year.

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/8415490/China-builds-higher-fences-over-fears-of-instability-in-North-Korea.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News – South Korea

N. Korea Tells S. Korea to 'Choose Between War, Dialogue'

March 31, 2011

By Sam Kim

SEOUL, March 31 (Yonhap) -- North Korea pressed South Korea on Thursday to "choose between dialogue and war," demanding that Seoul stop blaming Pyongyang for a series of deadly incidents last year that have stymied their relations.

In a statement marking the first anniversary of the sinking of the South Korean warship Cheonan, the North's National Defense Commission (NDC), the highest seat of power in Pyongyang, vowed to continue with its own investigation until Seoul no longer accuses the communist state of torpedoing the ship and killing 46 sailors.

An unidentified NDC spokesman also argued in the statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency that his country would not have shelled the South Korean island of Yeonpyeong in the Yellow Sea in November had Seoul refrained from provoking it first.

"Had they not preempted firing shells into the inviolable territorial waters of the DPRK, there would not have occurred the shelling on the island," he said, using the acronym for the North's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"The South Korean authorities and military warmongers should not persist in their reckless anti-DPRK hysteria under the pretext of the two cases," the spokesman said, according to the English-language version of his statement.

South Korea demands Pyongyang apologize for the incidents first before the sides can restore exchanges that could lead to the resumption of large-scale food aid to the impoverished North.

The North, considered to be in dire need of outside aid to sustain its population of 24 million, has made a series of proposals for inter-Korean talks since last year, only to remain empty-handed.

"The South Korean authorities and puppet military warmongers should properly understand that they are standing at the crossroads where they should choose between dialogue and war," the NDC spokesman said, threatening "a real war" if Seoul opposed its demand.

War on the Korean Peninsula would leave South Korea devastated, experts say, while it would be suicidal for the impoverished communist regime in the North.

During their colonel-level defense talks in early February, the two countries failed to produce any agreement on ways to ease their tension even though pressure rose on them to facilitate a mood for the resumption of six-party nuclear talks on the North.

In a survey that appeared to support the South's handling of the North, the Unification Ministry here said earlier Thursday that about 70 percent of South Koreans believe the North does not deserve cross-border food aid until it apologizes for the Cheonan sinking and the Yeongpyeong shelling.

According to the poll of 1,000 adults nationwide, about 75 percent also said the possibility of a further North Korean provocation remains high while 72 percent said the security risk on the peninsula is serious. The survey had a margin of error of 3.1 percentage points.

South and North Korea remain technically at war after the 1950-53 Korean War ended in a truce rather than a peace treaty.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/03/31/27/0401000000AEN20110331007900315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Philippine Times – Philippines

China Issues White Paper on National Defence

Thursday, 31st March, 2011

Indo-Asian News Service (IANS)

China Thursday issued a white paper on national defence, aiming to enhance its military transparency and boost the world's trust in its commitment to peaceful development.

The document, the seventh of its kind the Chinese government has issued since 1998, says China will never seek hegemony, nor will it adopt the approach of military expansion now or in the future, Xinhua reported.

It gives an overall picture of China's national defence ranging from the security environment, national defence policy, to defence expenditure and arms control.

On security environment, the paper says the world remains peaceful and stable at large, but the international security situation has become more complex and military competition remains fierce.

China is meanwhile confronted by more diverse and complex security challenges, it says.

China pursues a national defence policy which is defensive in nature, the white paper says. Such a pursuit is determined by China's development path, its fundamental aims, its foreign policy, and its historical and cultural traditions.

The goals and tasks of China's national defence in the new era are defined as safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development, maintaining social harmony and stability, accelerating the modernization of national defence and the armed forces, maintaining world peace and stability.

The white paper reviewed the modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), saying it has grown from a single service into a strong military force featuring a range of services and arms, and is now beginning to make progress towards informationization.

The PLA laid down a three-step development strategy and adopted a step-change approach which takes mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the focus.

On defence expenditure, the white paper says the increase has been kept at a reasonable and appropriate level. China's defence expenditure mainly comprises expenses for personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment, with each accounting for roughly one third of the total.

In the past two years, the increase in the defence expenditure has been used to improve support conditions for the troops and accomplish diversified military tasks, ranging from earthquake rescue and escort operations in the Gulf of Aden and waters off Somalia.

In view of the upward trend in purchasing prices and maintenance costs, China has moderately increased the funds for high-tech weaponry and equipment and their supporting facilities.

China is promoting the establishment of equal, mutually beneficial and effective mechanisms for military confidence-building, via strategic consultations and dialogues, cooperation on security and military exchanges with other countries, the paper said.

China attaches importance to and takes an active part in international efforts in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, it noted.

The country adheres to the complete fulfillment of the UN's role in this area, and that of other related international organizations and multilateral mechanisms.

It considers that existing multilateral arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation systems should be consolidated and strengthened, that the legitimate and reasonable security concerns of all countries should be respected and accommodated, and that global strategic balance and stability should be maintained.

The white paper also reviewed the deployment of the Chinese armed forces, national defence mobilization and reserve force building, military legal system, as well as science, technology and industry for national defence.

<http://story.philippinetimes.com/index.php/ct/9/cid/4a8b544d0e80ba53/id/762924/cs/1/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

China Daily – China

China Sticks to No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons

(Xinhua)

March 31, 2011

BEIJING - China has adhered to the policy of "no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances," says a white paper on the country's national defense issued on Thursday.

China has made the "unequivocal commitment" that "under no circumstances will it use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones," says the white paper, issued by the Information Office of the State Council, or Cabinet.

The paper says China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

China maintains that countries possessing the largest nuclear arsenals bear special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, it says. "They should further drastically reduce their nuclear arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible and legally-binding manner, so as to create the necessary conditions for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

When conditions are appropriate, other nuclear-weapon states should also join in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament, it says.

To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, "a viable, long-term plan with different phases, " including the conclusion of a convention on the "complete prohibition of nuclear weapons," it says.

China holds that, before the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon states should abandon any nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons, make an unequivocal commitment that under no circumstances will they use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and negotiate an international legal instrument in this regard.

In the meantime, nuclear-weapon states should negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against each other, the paper says.

China has played a constructive role in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Together with other signatories to the NPT, China is willing to sincerely implement the positive achievements of the Eighth NPT Review Conference in 2010.

China supports the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the early commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva.

The paper says as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a nuclear-weapon state signatory of the NPT, China has never evaded its obligations in nuclear disarmament and pursues an open, transparent and responsible nuclear policy.

It says China has never deployed nuclear weapons in foreign territory and has always "exercised the utmost restraint" in the development of nuclear weapons, and has never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will it ever do so.

"It will limit its nuclear capabilities to the minimum level required for national security," it says.

China has strictly abided by its commitment to a moratorium on nuclear testing and has actively participated in the work of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, and is steadily preparing for the national implementation of the Treaty, the paper says.

China is responsible for setting up 12 international monitoring stations and laboratories. At present, six primary seismological monitoring stations, three radionuclide stations, the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory and the China National Data Center have been set up, and one infrasound station is under construction.

The paper says China consistently supports the efforts of non-nuclear-weapon states in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, has already signed and ratified all the relevant protocols which have been opened for signature of any nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, and has reached agreement with the ASEAN countries on relevant issues under the Protocol of the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

China supports the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia and its protocols signed by Central Asian countries, and supports the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, it says.

China maintains that the global missile defense program will be detrimental to international strategic balance and stability, will undermine international and regional security, and will have a negative impact on the process of nuclear disarmament, the paper says.

China holds that no state should deploy overseas missile defense systems that have strategic missile defense capabilities or potential, or engage in any such international collaboration.

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/31/content_12256534.htm

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Japan Times – Japan
Friday, April 1, 2011

Hundreds of Corpses Believed Irradiated, Inaccessible

Kyodo News

Radiation is preventing the retrieval of hundreds of bodies from inside the 20-km evacuation zone around the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, police sources said Thursday.

Based on initial reports after the March 11 catastrophe, the number of bodies is estimated at between a few hundred and 1,000, one of the sources said, adding that high radiation is now hampering full-scale searches.

That view was supported by the Sunday find of high radiation levels on a body found in Okuma, Fukushima Prefecture, 5 km from the plant.

The rescuers are now in a bind. Even if they retrieve the bodies, anyone who comes into contact with them risks being irradiated, too, whether they're in the evacuation zone or not.

And if the bodies are cremated, the smoke could spread radioactive materials as well, the sources said. Even burial poses a problem. When the bodies decompose, they might contaminate the soil with radioactive materials.

Authorities are considering decontaminating and inspecting the bodies where they are found, but the sources said cleansing the decomposing bodies could damage them further.

<http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110401a2.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Press Release

U.S., China Expand Cooperation on Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

March 30, 2011

BEIJING – The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the China National Energy Administration today announced that they have agreed to continue expanding cooperation between the United States and China on nuclear security issues.

During a meeting of the Joint Coordinating Committee (JCC) of the U.S.-China Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement, NNSA Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Anne Harrington and Vice Administrator Qian Zhimin of the China National Energy Administration agreed that Chinese and U.S. experts would pursue additional areas for cooperation and continue research and development into new technology to guarantee a safe and secure nuclear future. They also agreed to establish a new joint working group on radioactive source security and stressed the importance of developing nuclear safety, safeguards and security in parallel.

This week's meeting is the latest example of the expanding nuclear security cooperation between the United States and China. Earlier this year, during a state visit to Washington, D.C., by Chinese President Hu Jintao, the United

States and China announced a memorandum of understanding for work at a Center of Excellence of nuclear security near Beijing.

“This meeting demonstrates the broad range of active and vital cooperation between the United States and China and reaffirms our mutual commitment to implementing the nuclear security agendas of our presidents,” said NNSA Deputy Administrator Harrington. “This framework also facilitates a broad group of important bilateral initiatives between our two countries, including the U.S. - China Bilateral Civil Nuclear Energy Cooperative Action Plan.”

Co-chaired by Ms. Harrington and Mr. Qian, this was the 6th meeting of the JCC. In addition to NNSA and the China National Energy Administration, the JCC also included representatives from the China Atomic Energy Authority, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Environmental Protection, the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy and the U.S. Department of State.

The two-day meeting consisted of plenary sessions and working group breakout sessions to discuss joint projects and exchange information on a comprehensive range of mutual interests, including emergency management, nuclear energy, nuclear security, nuclear safeguards, export controls, radioactive waste, and environmental management.

Signed in 1998, the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology Agreement is a legally binding mechanism between the United States and China that allows for bilateral technical cooperation in civil nuclear energy and nonproliferation. Over the years, this cooperation has covered a wide variety of areas, including nuclear technology and export controls, nuclear emergency management and safety, and high level waste management.

For example, since 2004 under the PUNT Agreement, NNSA’s Material Protection, Control & Accounting (MPC&A) Program has worked with China on the development of domestic nuclear security best practices, and the Next Generation Safeguards Initiative (NGSI) has worked to improve safeguards for advanced fuel cycle facilities. The Office of International Emergency Management and Cooperation has worked with China to develop and conduct emergency management training courses and shared data on emergency preparedness and response programs. Similarly, since 2007 the PUNT Agreement has facilitated efforts by NNSA’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative to work with its partners in China to improve radioactive source security.

<http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/punt33011>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Knoxville News Sentinel

Y-12 Seismically at Risk

9212 complex could be damaged, disabled by major quake, official says

By Frank Munger

March 31, 2011

OAK RIDGE - Despite millions of dollars spent on upgrades, the 60-year-old production hub at the Y-12 nuclear weapons plant remains seismically vulnerable and could be severely damaged or disabled by a major earthquake.

Sections of the 9212 complex, where bomb-grade uranium is processed, were built during World War II, and a federal spokesman at Y-12 said it's not possible to bring the old facility up to today's seismic standards. He said that's one of the reasons why the government wants to build a new Uranium Processing Facility, which is projected to cost as much as \$6.5 billion and won't be available for at least another decade.

The National Nuclear Security Administration initially declined to answer questions about 9212's structural integrity and whether it could withstand a major earthquake, but spokesman Steven Wyatt later issued this statement by email:

"Safety analyses show that a major earthquake could result in significant structural damage and process failure."

Process failure means the uranium operations would no longer function, Wyatt said.

The spokesman confirmed that an earthquake could potentially compromise the safety measures in place to prevent a nuclear criticality - an event involving an uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction and release of radiation. "We have analyzed this very carefully and have not identified any scenarios that would have an impact beyond a few meters from the facility," he said.

No information on potential impacts to workers at 9212 was released.

Wyatt said Y-12's seismic analyses are based on the "anticipated maximum horizontal ground surface accelerations" for this area, with a range of 0.006 to 0.30 on the Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale. That correlates roughly to an earthquake between 5.0 and 6.0 on the Richter scale, he said.

The latest evaluation was done in 2005, and that report is not releasable to the public, Wyatt said.

A 1987 report, which was obtained by the News Sentinel years ago through a Freedom of Information Act request, identified more than 500 plausible scenarios for significant earthquake damage at 9212 - each of which would lead to at least one of the "consequences of interest."

Those consequences were serious injury or death of personnel; loss of plant capability; and criticality. At that time, the E-wing of 9212 was considered the most vulnerable because it would collapse with the lowest ground acceleration (0.14), with 20 of the top 50 scenarios involving serious injuries or deaths.

Thirteen of the 18 criticality scenarios also were at E-wing, where manufacturing work with highly enriched uranium is conducted. It's not immediately clear if E-wing today is in better shape or worse shape than it was 20 years ago.

The 9212 complex is a sprawling network of inter-connected process buildings, many of which were added during Y-12's burgeoning work on nuclear weapons during the Cold War 1950s. Concerns about its safety and the structural soundness are not new.

In 1989, a structural engineer at Lockwood Greene Engineers, a Department of Energy contractor, said he was fired after his study concluded that 9212 would collapse during a major earthquake. The engineer, Paul Nestel, said his study was later revised by other engineers to show that the building could withstand an earthquake.

A DOE investigation concluded that Nestel's firing was inappropriate, although not directly tied to his seismic study of the Y-12 facility. He was later offered his job back, but declined, and reportedly received a \$33,000 financial settlement.

The report, meanwhile, brought new scrutiny to 9212 complex, which contains numerous chemical processes for recycling highly enriched uranium used in nuclear weapons. At least one of the building's wings is used to cast, fabricate and machine uranium metal in various shapes.

In early 1990, a DOE nuclear safety panel headed by John Ahearne, a former chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, reviewed the seismic issues while holding a session in Oak Ridge and called for additional studies.

There have been other evaluations since then, including regular reports by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. The DNFSB has called for more aggressive upgrades at 9212 as the schedule for UPF keeps getting delayed. In a 2005 letter to NNSA, the board's then-chairman A.J. Eggenberger wrote that the Y-12 contractor recommended that some modifications to address structural deficiencies not be made "because of the facility's limited life, given the planned construction and start-up of a replacement facility by 2013."

In a September 2010 letter to Congress, the safety board wrote, "The Department of Energy continues to rely on aging facilities to carry out hazardous production missions." The board cited the 9212 complex at Y-12 as an "acute" example, along with a plutonium operation at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.

"These two facilities are structurally unsound and are unsuitable for protracted use," said the report signed by the safety board's five members. "The board is especially concerned as schedules for replacement facilities continue to slip . . ."

The Oak Ridge situation is complicated by the Y-12 facility's reportedly essential role in the nuclear weapons program. The current plan is to operate the 9212 complex until the Uranium Processing Facility comes online. However, construction of UPF isn't scheduled to start until 2012 and won't be completed until 2020, at the earliest, and the new facility won't be fully operable until 2024.

Wyatt said the government has invested millions of dollars and made "numerous modifications" to 9212 over the past 20 years, "taking seismic design into consideration."

Those modifications included "efforts to fortify walls and roofing to strengthen the structural integrity of the facility by adding building cross bracing, modifications to equipment and piping," and the addition of seismic shut-off valves for some processes, he said.

There also is a continuing effort to minimize the quantity of nuclear material at risk, thus reducing the consequences in the event on an earthquake or other problem.

<http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2011/mar/31/y-12-seismically-at-risk/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Islamists Are Elated by Revolts, Cleric Says

By SCOTT SHANE

WASHINGTON — Anwar al-Awlaki, the Yemeni-American cleric who is a top propagandist for Al Qaeda, broke his silence on the uprisings in the Arab world on Wednesday, claiming that Islamist extremists had gleefully watched the success of protest movements against governments they had long despised.

“The mujahedeen around the world are going through a moment of elation,” Mr. Awlaki wrote in a new issue of the English-language Qaeda magazine Inspire, “and I wonder whether the West is aware of the upsurge of mujahedeen activity in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Arabia, Algeria and Morocco?”

Mr. Awlaki’s four-page essay, titled “The Tsunami of Change,” is among a handful of statements by Al Qaeda’s leaders countering the common view among Western analysts that the terrorist network looks irrelevant at a time of change unprecedented in the modern Middle East. In ousting the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt and threatening other Arab leaders, a core of secular-leaning demonstrators have called for democracy and generally avoided violence — all at odds with Al Qaeda’s creed as it tries to instill rigid Islamist rule across the world.

In an audio statement this month, the Egyptian deputy to Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahri, pleaded with the Egyptians who toppled President Hosni Mubarak to shun the United States, reject democracy and embrace Islam as the answer to their problems. Arguing that Al Qaeda deserved some indirect credit for the uprisings, he said the United States’ willingness to drop its support for Mr. Mubarak and other authoritarian leaders was a “direct result” of the Sept. 11 attacks.

Mr. Awlaki’s essay is more colloquial and confident, asserting that the momentous change in Arab countries left Western leaders “confused, worried, and unhappy for the departure of some of its closest and most reliable friends.”

He quotes American commentators who describe the uprisings as a refutation of Al Qaeda, including Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s assertion last month that “the success of peaceful protests has discredited the extremists.”

Mr. Awlaki, who is thought to be hiding in Yemen, argues that such conclusions are premature. “The outcome doesn’t have to be an Islamic government for us to consider what is occurring to be a step in the right direction,” he writes.

By “breaking the barriers of fear” and toppling leaders who protected “American imperial interests,” he asserts, the uprisings should play to the long-term advantage of Al Qaeda’s philosophy. He points to Yemen and Libya, where embattled leaders are clinging to power, as places where turmoil could open possibilities for jihadists to organize.

Mr. Awlaki’s statement comes as some American officials have expressed anxiety about just that possibility. In Libya, an American military official said this week that there were “flickers” of intelligence suggesting that Qaeda or Hezbollah operatives were among the rebels fighting Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi. And in Yemen, President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s weakening grip on power could take pressure off Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Expressing hope that revolution will spread from Yemen to Saudi Arabia, Mr. Awlaki asks, “Doesn’t the West realize how the jihadi work would just take off as soon as the regimes of the Gulf start crumbling?”

Jarret Brachman, a counterterrorism analyst and author of “Global Jihadism,” said the Qaeda propagandists are “consummate opportunists — no matter what happens, these guys will try to spin it to their benefit.” But he said several influential Qaeda theorists appear to believe that the departure of authoritarian leaders will prove advantageous.

“Al Qaeda recognizes how marginal they are on this,” Mr. Brachman said. “But it could open the kind of operating space they’ve wanted for a long time.”

Inspire magazine, five issues of which have been posted on militant Web sites, is believed to be the work primarily of Samir Khan, a Saudi-born American who grew up in Queens and North Carolina before moving to Yemen in 2009. It is a slick, graphics-heavy, irreverent publication aimed at young Muslims attracted to the extremist cause; the latest issue includes an invitation to readers to e-mail questions to Mr. Awlaki and a two-page primer on how to use an AK automatic rifle.

Mr. Khan himself contributed to Inspire an appeal to Egyptians not to stop after overthrowing Mr. Mubarak but to impose religious rule.

“The question now comes: what do you do if your government decides not to rule by Shariah?” he asks, referring to Islamic law. “Who does your loyalty go to? The state or Allah?”

<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/middleeast/31inspire.html?partner=rss&emc=rss>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Al Bawaba News – Jordan

Al Qaeda Declares South Yemen Province as "Islamic Emirate"

March 31, 2011

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has announced Yemen's Abyan province as an "Islamic emirate".

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has announced Yemen's Abyan province as an "Islamic emirate". The statement was issued by the group and posted on the internet. "From now on, women who go out to the markets need to be accompanied by a relative, who carry a proof by identity cards, or passports," it said.

Earlier this week, it was reported that gunmen took control on the presidential palace complex, communications facilities and a local ammunitions factory.

Following the announcement of al-Qaeda, Yemeni opposition parties called their members and supporters to form popular committees , in order to" protect citizens, public and private properties from the chaos that is planned by the regime, which wants "to stay as long as possible and distort the purity of this great people's revolution. "

On Saturday, the building of the presidential palace and the local radio station in the Directorate of "Jaar", Abyan governorate, south of Yemen, was surrounded by gunmen. The gunmen have distributing leaflets calling for the security men to surrender and hand over their weapons.

<http://www1.albawaba.com/main-headlines/al-qaeda-declares-south-yemen-province-islamic-emirate>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Huffington Post

OPINION

Pakistan in Nuclear Upswing

By Olli Heinonen

March 30, 2011

The world's five original nuclear weapons countries have all suspended production of fissile materials for new weapons and are negotiating cuts in their nuclear arsenals. But one nuclear-armed nation is heading in the opposite direction. Pakistan is steadily building more nuclear weapons, adding production capacity to produce plutonium and enrich uranium, and building new missiles to deliver nuclear warheads.

The nuclear risks in Pakistan are three-fold: its non-proliferation record is poor, there are concerns about the security of sensitive nuclear materials, and there is no sign of a slowdown in its nuclear weapons drive. A global response needs to be calibrated to address all three of these potential threats.

On Feb. 9, the Institute for Science and International Security, a non-profit group created by former UN weapons inspector David Albright, reported that Pakistan appears to be building a fourth plutonium reactor at the Khushab complex, and is expanding plutonium separation capabilities at another site. Another report, from the International Panel of Fissile Materials, says Pakistan now has 70 to 90 nuclear warheads, more than its rival India. This puts Pakistan on track to command the world's fourth-largest nuclear weapons arsenal by the end of the decade.

The evidence suggests that Pakistan is trying to develop a second-strike nuclear capability. Pakistan already has brought to a halt the negotiations in Geneva for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, sought by President Obama and virtually the entire membership of the Disarmament Conference. Pakistan has tested cruise and other missiles that can carry strategic warheads from land or even from submarines.

North Korea and Pakistan also continue to partner each other such as in matters of missile and uranium enrichment technologies. With fears of continued nuclear proliferation and fueled by complicated regional dynamics and on-going domestic instability, it is imperative for the world to make greater efforts to persuade and pressure Pakistan to halt its nuclear buildup. Not providing sufficient attention and expanding the effort to place Pakistan's nuclear buildup as a priority issue may risk a nuclear proliferation crisis of a significant scale.

Another reason why the world needs to focus on ensuring that Pakistan's nuclear material, particular at the bulk handling facilities, remains under proper safeguards is because Pakistan is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. In other words, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide comprehensive safeguards is limited. In the longer term, this raises a further challenge of creating effective multinational mechanisms that exercise oversight over countries that remain outside the NPT and not just those countries that voluntarily operate within the system.

In the meantime, some other avenues for action are available for consideration. In 2009, ISIS reported the restart of construction of a partially built plutonium reprocessing plant at Chashma. If any French technology was used in the Chashma plant, or at the New Laboratories established near Rawalpindi, the French government could request that the facilities be subject to IAEA safeguards, even though Pakistan is not a treaty signatory. This could fall under the bilateral nuclear co-operation agreement between France and Pakistan.

Another avenue hinges on Pakistan's access to uranium. The existing three Pakistani nuclear reactors at Khushab require more than 40 tons of uranium annually. These, together with the possible establishment of a further uranium enrichment plant at Gadwal, are likely to generate demands that exceed Pakistan's current domestic uranium stockpiles. For this reason, the IAEA's provision of assistance to Pakistan in uranium mining exploration in the past has not been without controversy. Assistance to explore, mine and mill uranium should be provided only under verifiable assurances has been provided by Pakistan on its end use.

Energy security plays a crucial role for the improvement and stability of Pakistan. Providing benefits to the future development of Pakistan's civilian nuclear program, which has been struggling under decades of sanctions, in return for certain trade-offs that address international concerns over Pakistan's production of fissile material and build-up of reprocessing capabilities should be further strengthened. Joint efforts to provide Pakistan with modern, safe and secure nuclear power reactors, and, where necessary, upgrade old ones, could move Pakistan away from a calculated nuclear build-up. But the international community has not remained as seized with the issue as warranted.

Olli Heinonen is former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency. In September, he joined Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as a senior fellow.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/olli-heinonen/pakistan-in-nuclear-upswing_b_842650.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Diplomat - Japan
OPINION/Flashpoints

A Curious Pakistan Nuclear Policy

March 30, 2011

By Manpreet Sethi

Despite a track record of proliferation, the US and others seem ready to make excuses for Pakistan.

Over the past fortnight, as the world's attention has been focused on the evolving situation surrounding the crisis at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power stations, two other nuclear developments passed largely unnoticed.

First, the International Atomic Energy Agency granted its approval of two new nuclear reactors that China is planning to build at Chashma in Pakistan. This is in addition to the two that Beijing is already engaged in developing at the same site, something which it had disclosed at the time of its joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 2004. China's commitment to building Chashma 3 and 4 has only surfaced in the last couple of years, after the granting of the NSG waiver on international nuclear commerce to India.

The second key bit of news was the US decision to tamely accept the Chinese move to extend nuclear cooperation to Pakistan, a non-signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite a clear violation of the international guidelines on nuclear trade. Indeed, the US assistant secretary responsible for South Asian affairs even defended the deal by highlighting Pakistan's energy deficit!

Whether or not the two new reactors are able to ease the electricity situation for Pakistan, it's clear that a country with nuclear weapons can get away with a lot more than one that doesn't have such weapons of mass destruction.

Pakistan's ability to use its nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip—for conventional weaponry, for financial support from other Muslim nations, for evading sanctions over nuclear proliferation, for escaping retaliation by using the shield of nuclear weapons while allegedly fomenting cross-border terrorism in India—has been proven time and again. No wonder nuclear weapons are seen as the most important strategic asset of the Pakistani military establishment.

Ever since India was granted the NSG waiver that made it eligible for international nuclear trade, Pakistan has cried foul. The pity is when other nations, including the United States, begin to accept the Pakistani argument that it's being discriminated against. Nothing could be further from the truth. The fact of the matter is that India earned the waiver by strictly observing the principle of non-proliferation, and it has a six-decade track record to show for it. The Pakistani establishment, meanwhile, has run a well-documented nuclear proliferation enterprise in which it has at times clandestinely accepted nuclear weapons technology and material, and clandestinely retransferred it to others.

The international community hasn't been able to punish Islamabad for any of these acts. But to condone them and actually accept that there should be parity in treatment between India and Pakistan on nuclear cooperation should be unacceptable.

The two countries are wide apart in their nuclear behavior. There can be no room for equal treatment.

Manpreet Sethi heads the project on Nuclear Security at the Centre for Air Power Studies (CAPS), New Delhi. Sethi lectures regularly at all training establishments of the Indian Armed Forces, including the National Defence College. She is author of Nuclear Strategy: India's March Towards Credible Deterrence (2009).

<http://the-diplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2011/03/30/a-curious-pakistan-nuclear-policy/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Chosun Ilbo – South Korea

OPINION

Libya Intervention Makes It Harder to Denuclearize N.Korea

By Kang In-sun

March 30, 2011

The justification of the United States, United Kingdom and France for their air strikes against Libya is that they have a responsibility to protect civilians. This is a principle whereby the international community intervenes to protect the people of a country that either fails to show the will to do it by itself or commits humanitarian crimes against them.

Immediately before the allied forces started air raids on March 19, there was a risk of a massacre by the forces loyal to Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi against the rebel forces. When the Gadhafi forces began attacking Benghazi, the stronghold of the rebel forces, it looked like the country would be turned into a "river of blood" as Gadhafi's son Saif al-Islam warned.

Citing the responsibility to protect civilians, the UN Security Council passed a resolution to enforce a no-fly zone over parts of Libya. The aim was ostensibly to avoid another nightmare like Rwanda, where the international community, failing to find proper causes and timing for intervention, had to look on at the slaughter of 1 million people.

But if Gadhafi had nuclear weapons, would the world community have done the same? North Korea seems to have asked itself the same question. Pyongyang said on March 22 the nuclear disarmament of Libya "turned out to be a mode of aggression whereby [the U.S.] coaxed the former with such sweet words as 'guarantee of security' and 'improvement of relations' to disarm and then swallowed it up by force."

Gadhafi announced in December 2003 he was abandoning weapons of mass destruction including nuclear arms and admitted International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. Libya surrendered to the sanctions applied by the world community in the year when the U.S. attacked Iraq on the pretext of Saddam Hussein's alleged WMD program.

Libya disassembled and destroyed about a dozen uranium enrichment facilities and transported 25 tons of materials including uranium to a base in Tennessee over nearly three years. That made it safe for the Western alliance to intervene.

But North Korea is different. Decades of dictatorship, oppression and starvation would seem to create a situation where the international community has every responsibility to protect civilians. But will it intervene? The difference is that the North has nuclear weapons. The New York Times recently speculated that if Gadhafi had continued his nuclear development, he would have had enough nuclear warheads by now to deter a western intervention.

The lessons Kim Jong-il seems to have learned from Libya are that the international community may apply the principle of protecting civilians if a country gives up its nuclear weapons, and that in that case he would have to fight a bloody war with conventional arms alone. In other words, it will become even harder to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear arms. The turmoil in the Middle East has made denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula more difficult.

By Kang In-sun from the Chosun Ilbo's News Desk

http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/03/30/2011033001315.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Foreign Policy In Focus – Washington, D.C.
Opinion/Analysis

Nukes In Europe: Coming Home Soon

March 30, 2011

By Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden

The last U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe may be on their way home, ending more than 50 years of their deployment abroad. A new report on the future of these weapons shows that 24 NATO members seek to end deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe or will not block a NATO consensus decision to remove them. Only three countries are holding out, and only one is actively trying to break the emerging consensus. The coming months will be decisive for the future of the 200 or so U.S. nukes in Europe.

IKV Pax Christi, a Dutch peace and security NGO, interviewed all 28 NATO member delegations to find out exactly what they think about the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). The resulting *Withdrawal Issues* report confirms minimal support for future TNW deployment in Europe. Many delegations deem redundant the B61 gravity bombs designed to be dropped from fighter aircraft.

With growing momentum toward a world without nuclear weapons, many regard the TNW as the low hanging fruit, “the first ones to go.”

Contrary to oft-repeated myths, the so-called new NATO countries are not more reluctant to have the bombs removed. Countries closer to Russia are not more likely to want to keep these nuclear weapons. Nor did any delegation mention the persistent assumption that Turkey would build its own nuclear bomb in the event of TNW withdrawal.

Throughout 2010, the United States remained remarkably flexible, saying that it would leave any decision on the future of these TNW to European allies. Officially, the United States had no preference. Behind the scenes though, U.S. diplomats in Brussels are quite openly denouncing the relevance of the TNW for current and future NATO defence and deterrence policy and posture. It is a public secret that U.S. ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder favors phasing out the TNW.

Clearing the Obstacles

The countries that want the TNW gone usually do not expect them to be out today or tomorrow. NATO countries list a number of obstacles that need to be cleared prior to a consensus decision to return the TNW to the United States. Three obstacles top the list.

First, TNW withdrawal should not undermine alliance cohesion. The visibility of the transatlantic bond needs to be guaranteed. In addition, current nuclear burden sharing needs to be replaced by new forms of burden sharing. This should not be a difficult obstacle to overcome. Countries have already suggested a range of plans for “more practical” or “more useful” forms of burden-sharing.

Second, 10 NATO delegations mention France as a key obstacle by. In the run up to the November 2010 NATO Strategic Concept, France went out of its way to make sure that both the nuclear posture (force deployment, numbers, and locations) and policy (continued nuclear sharing) of the alliance remained unchanged. For a long time, France blocked NATO plans for missile defence. France also objected to a NATO civilian capacity. It was France, apparently, that most vocally opposed the adoption of a “negative security assurance” or similar nuclear weapons declaratory policy. According to some sources, France took these conservative positions to be able to trade them off one by one, only to get an unchanged nuclear posture in return.

Finally, according to half the delegations, TNW withdrawal cannot be achieved without first seeking some form of reciprocity with Russia. Russia maintains a large stock of TNW, some deployed close to NATO territory. Six NATO countries say they will only agree to TNW withdrawal if Russia relocates at least part of its TNW arsenal. Others are less attached to the idea, saying that some form of reciprocity “would be preferred” or “would help to speed along the debate within NATO.” Only one country admitted to being disgruntled about the link made with Russia, reasoning that this way Russia and NATO are offering each other excuses to keep their TNW arsenals.

For now, the conservative French strategy has prevailed. The Strategic Concept reflects the failure to come to a conclusion on NATO’s nuclear policies and posture. Unable to take a clear position on TNW, the text remains vague and essentially pushed the issue onto the “Defence and Deterrence Posture Review” that should conclude by 2012.

Changing Nuclear Policy

Russian reciprocity remains the biggest concern. NATO says it will only relocate the TNW back to the United States if Russia gives up something too. Russia says it will not even start talking about its TNW until the United States brings its nukes home. The United States basically says it would be willing to do so, but only if backed by NATO consensus. How to move beyond the Russia- NATO-U.S. loop of reciprocity is central to any forward progress on removing U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe.

Although the United States took a back-row position in the TNW discussions in 2010, in 2011 it seems determined to regain a leadership role. In his message to the U.S. Senate, on the occasion of the New START ratification, President Obama wrote that he will seek to initiate negotiations with Russia on TNW “following consultation with NATO allies but not later than one year after entry into force of the New START treaty.” The deadline is clear: European allies have one year to deal with their internal division on TNW. If the allies fail to come to a conclusion, the United States will decide.

The evidence cited in the IKV Pax Christi report suggests that the allied decision can’t be anything but withdrawal. There is simply not enough support for continued deployment. The U.S. deadline and the process of the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review give NATO the time to discuss new ways of burden-sharing and to reassure France that ending the TNW deployment in Europe will not affect the autonomous French nuclear status. The year also offers NATO a chance to lay the groundwork for the United States and Russia to discuss the last remaining tactical nuclear differences of the Cold War.

The Obama administration has the historical opportunity to end TNW deployment outside U.S. territory. It would be a major contribution to the ultimate aim of a world without nuclear weapons, and it would bring the number of countries with nuclear weapons on their territory down from 14 to nine. It is time to put the Cold War nuclear posture of the alliance to bed, and to bring the U.S. weapons home.

Wilbert van der Zeijden is the researcher for IKV Pax Christi’s Nuclear Disarmament program. Susi Snyder is the program leader for IKV Pax Christi’s Nuclear Disarmament program. Both are contributors to Foreign Policy In Focus.

http://www.fpfif.org/articles/nukes_in_europe_coming_home_soon

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Arab News – Saudi Arabia

OPINION/Column

The ‘No First Use’ of N-Weapons Debate

By Jonathan Powers

March 30, 2011

NOW that the new nuclear arms reduction treaty between the US and Russia is safely tucked up in bed we have to ask, “What next?”

There are a number of imperatives: To agree to further sharp cuts in nuclear armories and this time including the UK, France, China and Israel, a Test Ban Treaty, a ban on the further stockpiling of fissile material, getting rid of short range missiles based in Europe, agreeing to joint NATO-Russian anti-missile defenses in Europe and, not least, burying the doctrine of “no first use”.

An agreement on the “no first use” (NFU) doctrine would make the protagonists agree that none of them would be the first to use nuclear weapons, that they would only use them in case of a nuclear attack. For years the Soviet Union had such a policy. But a few years ago its successor state, Russia, rescinded it. The US has rejected a “no first use” policy all along and there are no indications that President Barack Obama is seeking to change it.

This means if there were an attack with conventional weapons or biological and chemical weapons, the defender would face no legal restrictions on using its nuclear weapons to counter it.

This is a dangerous game. In a crisis it would increase the chances of accidental, unauthorized or deliberate use of nuclear weapons. In a future crisis, the fear — real or imagined — that the US might attempt a disarming first strike increases the possibility of nuclear escalation.

As recently as the presidency of George W. Bush the value of the doctrine of “first use” was dusted off again. He talked about pre-emptive and preventive war, just as policy makers had at the height of the Cold War when the US considered first-strike options against the Soviet Union during the Berlin crisis and also against China’s infant bomb program.

One of the arguments popular with the Bush administration was the use of nuclear weapons to destroy hard and deeply buried targets — as with North Korea and perhaps with Iran. Another was the need to deter the use of other weapons of mass destruction — biological and chemical weapons.

Just before the start of the First Gulf War, at the time of the presidency of George H.W. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker met Iraq’s foreign minister. Baker wrote in his memoirs, “I deliberately left the impression that the use of chemical or biological agents by Iraq would invite tactical nuclear retaliation.” (Baker elsewhere in his memoirs says this was a bluff. The US would not have used nuclear weapons.)

Why should a country need to threaten “first use” when it has an all powerful conventional military on which it spends more than all other countries put together? Could the US be sure that a nuclear attack would be a 100 percent successful? What if it failed to destroy all the enemy’s weapons of mass destruction? Then the enemy would retaliate. Increasingly, countries with such weapons are deploying mobile missiles extremely hard to locate. “First use” would be impotent when an adversary possesses submerged nuclear-armed submarines.

A “no first use” treaty would clearly enhance stability. First, it would help decrease opponents' trepidations about a US first strike, and so decrease the possibility of weapons being used accidentally or inadvertently as the enemy would feel compelled to keep its missiles on a permanent hair trigger alert. Moreover, during a building crisis, it might encourage the enemy to fire its rockets first, believing if it didn't they would be taken out. In such a scenario NFU would have been entirely counterproductive. Second, the US would then have a consistent and inherently credible nuclear policy. Third, a change in US policy would probably persuade Russia to do the same and sign such a treaty. The UK and India, which along with Russia dropped their NFU policy, would probably sign it too, as would China and France. Israel, Pakistan and India probably wouldn't.

This is not a “soft option”. This is common sense. Toward the end of the Cold War a bunch of eminent American statesman — McGeorge Bundy, George Kennan, Robert McNamara and Gerard Smith — in an influential article in Foreign Affairs — advocated that NATO adopt NFU. "There is no way for anyone to have any confidence that ("first use") nuclear action will not lead to further and more damaging exchanges", they wrote.

At the moment the Obama administration appears to be resting on its laurels. Having got the nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia in the bag it looks like coasting along at least to the next election. But why should North Korea, Pakistan, India and China, Israel and perhaps Iran make any move to limit the ambitions of their nuclear armory when the US, Russia, the UK, France have done so little?

Jonathan Powers a columnist, film-maker and writer. M.Sc in economics, trained as a geographer and agricultural economist. For 30 years a journalist, of which 17 as columnist for the International Herald Tribune 1974-1991; he has been a regular guest columnist in New York Times and Encounter.

<http://arabnews.com/opinion/columns/article336545.ece>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

EurAsia Review - Spain

Opinion/Analysis

Indian Pursuit of Ballistic Missile Defence Program – Analysis

By Rida Zeenat

March 31, 2011

Recently India conducted a successful ballistic missile defence test which was capable enough to intercept and kill the incoming missile. This shows that Indian ballistic missile defence program comprising of long range tracking radar, command and control system and the interceptor, is maturing at a faster pace. As a result, the South Asian strategic stability would be challenged as there are diversification of threats and limited response options, BMD adds value to the complexity of the region.

India believes in nuclear dominance in the region and aspires to have extended self defence. It aims to become a global power. The technological edge that it is struggling to acquire over Pakistan and China has been to some extent proven by the successful ballistic missile defence test it conducted on 6th March 2011. Till now India has conducted six tests out of which four were successful and two failed due to technological reasons. But now India would proudly be a part of the elite club of the ‘BMD haves’ which includes United States, Russia and Israel.

India acquired the system with the technological assistance of United States and Israel. Indian BMD program has a two-tiered system namely Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) for high altitude interception and Advanced Air Defence (AAD) for lower altitude interception. The PAD missiles are for intercepting ballistic missiles at altitudes between 50-80 km and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile is for destroying them at heights ranging 15-30 km.

India’s future plans include two new anti ballistic missiles that can intercept Inter Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) namely Advanced Defence (AD-1 and AD-2) which would be capable of intercepting and destroying a missile at a range around 5,000 km (3,100 mi)

India justifies its acquisition of BMD by stating that as India has a no first use policy (NFU) therefore in order to ensure its second strike capability and to be able to absorb the first strike and retaliate it needs BMD. This would add value to its deterrent capability. Indian BMD is theatre missile defence it cannot protect the entire Indian soil but can only give protection to its some land-based strategic locations. It has Nuclear submarines INS Arihant which would be inducted in Indian Navy by 2012 will protect its seas.

Another dimension that adds fuel to the fire is the Indian plan to accommodate the Anti-Satellite (ASAT) as apart of its BMD program. India believes that its high-altitude interceptors can indeed serve as Anti-Satellite weapons (ASAT) which would be capable of destroying low orbit satellites. India perceives that its space assets are not secure and are threatened from China, as China possesses Anti-Satellite weapons therefore it has all the right to acquire ASAT which will ultimately enhance its security in space. Moreover before a legally binding framework comes into being which would prohibit the acquisition of Anti-Satellite weapons India wants to be the part of the club of 'ASAT haves' rather than 'have-nots'.

DRDO Director General V.K. Saraswat announced during 97th Indian Science Congress "India was developing lasers and an exo-atmospheric kill vehicle that could be combined to produce a weapon to destroy enemy satellites in orbit, kill vehicle, which is needed for intercepting the satellite, needs to be developed, and that work is going on as part of the ballistic missile defense program by 2014."

India is on the road to acquire laser-based anti-ballistic missile systems called Directed Energy Weapons (DEWs). DEW weapons can kill incoming ballistic missiles by bombarding them with subatomic particles or electromagnetic waves. The weapons are capable of intercepting missiles soon after they are launched towards India. According to DRDO scientist the DEW laser weapon is capable of producing 25-kilowatt pulses that can destroy a ballistic missile within seven kilometers. One of these weapons is the air defense dazzler, which can engage enemy aircraft and helicopters at a range of 10 kilometers.

The Indian pursuit of BMD and its goal to accommodate ASAT will have regional implications. It not only provokes Pakistan but also China to take requisite steps in order to have counter measures to overcome Indian BMD. As a result of which China conducted successful BMD test in 2010 and is on the road to acquire effective BMD program in near future.

Whereas, Pakistan's economy does not support it to acquire BMD program. Pakistan would feel insecure as its counter measure strike capability is not sufficient and secondly it does not possess any assured second strike capability. That is the reason that it sticks to First Use policy to equalize the deterrent equation. It would ultimately engage in acquiring additional missiles and launchers to devise a much larger attacking force which would elude the Indian interceptors, leading to triangular security dilemma in the region.

Moreover Pakistan would improve the nuclear arsenals qualitatively and quantitatively as it considers the nuclear weapons an integral part of its defence system which would result in nuclear instability.

This rapid technological inflow, aim to have a comprehensive space program and western discriminatory approaches to make India a 'Shining India' is very threatening for Pakistan and China also up to an extent. India has been accommodated into the four export control regimes namely Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Australia Group (AG), Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) would further make India technology enabler and legitimizing India's status.

Indian defence and space companies DRDO and ISRO respectively have been removed from entity list which would provide India hi-tech and nuclear technology access. India will further pursue its space program and struggle to get the technological edge over Pakistan and China.

This shows that India would be able to pursue its ballistic missile defence program and is planning to deploy it in near future and If India does so it will assure its second strike capability. Although BMD is defensive technology, highly expensive and technologically uncertain but its possession fortifies a state to adopt offensive policies. India has moved from deterrence to pre-emption compelling states to further improve their response option which destabilizes the strategic equation of the entire region.

Rida Zeenat is working as a Research Fellow at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI). She holds M.Sc. degree in Defence and Diplomatic Studies from Fatima Jinnah Women University, Pakistan. Her M.Sc. dissertation was based on "Pakistan's Nuclear Doctrine of Credible Minimum Deterrence". She has also participated at various current affairs television programs.

<http://www.eurasiareview.com/indian-pursuit-of-ballistic-missile-defence-program-analysis-31032011/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Institute for Defense Studies & Analysis – India
OPINION/Analysis

White Paper on China's National Defence 2010

Rukmani Gupta
April 1, 2011

China issued its latest biennial defence white paper on March 31, 2011. Titled “China’s National Defense in 2010,” the seventh such document published since 1998, it provides an overview of China’s understanding of its security environment and its national defence policy.

Assessing China’s domestic achievements and reviewing the international environment, Hu Jintao had declared at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th CPC Central Committee in October 2010 that China was still in a period of strategic opportunity. That China views the second decade of the 21st century a period of “strategic opportunity” is borne out by the assessments of the security situation made in the white paper. The focus on economics is apparent. Not only is “the international balance of power” believed to be changing through “economic strength”, but “reform in international systems” is identified as the prevailing trend, with steady progress in the establishment of “mechanisms for the management of the global economy.” A not-so-oblique criticism of American economic policies is apparent in the statement that “deep seated contradictions and structural problems behind the international financial crises have not been resolved.”

Despite the familiar lament over arms sales to Taiwan, the United States’ involvement in the Asia-Pacific and the reinforcement of American military alliances in the region, China’s assessment of its Comprehensive National Strength is very positive. The current white paper claims that China’s “comprehensive national strength has **stepped up to a new stage**.” Unlike the previous white paper, which simply states that “China would not seek hegemony or engage in military expansion...**no matter how it develops**,” the current document changes this almost banal proclamation to “China will never seek hegemony..., no matter how its economy develops.” The watch word then in assessing the international environment and China’s prospects is obviously ‘economy’, and China is well aware of the threat perceptions that its unprecedented economic growth have engendered. That China would be more confident after weathering the economic storms of recent years was expected. The surprise lies in the apparent self-assurance in the face of increasing “suspicion about China, interference and countering moves against China from the outside” and pressure in preserving China’s territorial integrity and the maritime rights and interests of its “vast territories and territorial seas.”

The white paper sets four tasks for national defence:

1. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security and interests of national development;
2. Maintaining social harmony and stability;
3. Accelerating the modernization of national defence and the armed forces;
4. Maintaining world peace and stability.

The defence of security interests in “cyber space” has been included in the tasks for national defence for the first time and is an indicator of its high priority. This is especially relevant given that the creation of a joint operation system has been declared as the focal point of PLA modernization. The document also states that a “step-change development has been achieved in information infrastructure” within the armed forces with the total length of “the national defense optical fiber communication network” being increased by a “large margin.” This forms a new generation information transmission network where optical fibre communication is the mainstay and satellite and short-wave communications are supplementary.

Tracing the history of PLA modernization to the series of reforms in military command, organization, training and regulation after 1949, rather than the 1970s and 80s as was the earlier practice, the current document presents the military modernization drive as a rational extension of a process already underway.

According to the white paper, the PLA has made great progress in its modernization and informationization objectives. As in previous years, the building of new combat capacity to win local wars in conditions of informationization and strengthening capabilities in fire power, mobility, protection and support is emphasised. The document states that the PLA Army has developed new types of combat forces, optimised organisation and structure, accelerated digitised upgrading and retrofitting of battle weaponry and deployed new weapon platforms. The transformation of the PLA Air Force is said to be focused on air and missile defence, and strategic projection for which training in complex electromagnetic environments and different tactical contexts is conducted. The document also reviews modernization of the PLA Navy which is seen to have evolved “in line with the requirements of offshore defense strategy.” However, an enunciation of this “offshore defense strategy” is not forthcoming. What is made clear is that the PLA Navy seeks new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-term maritime missions while continuing investment in a shore-based support system. With regard to the PLA Second Artillery Force, two more capability indices of ‘protection’ and ‘survivability’ are added to the four capabilities (‘rapid reaction,’ ‘penetration,’ ‘precision strike,’ and ‘damage infliction’) mentioned in earlier documents. In assessing the military modernization process, a “notable improvement in the PLA’s capabilities of equipment support in long-distance and trans-regional maneuvers, escort operations in distant waters and complex battlefield environments” is declared. Continuing with the model of integrated civilian-military development, the Chinese government is working to “integrate combat-readiness as an element in the national transportation grid” and aims at synchronized construction of military transportation facilities and urban development.

It is noted that the percentage increase in the defence budget for the year 2010 had been lower than previous years and the primary heads of expenditure are identified as: improved support conditions for the troops; diversified military tasks; Revolution in Military Affairs, including purchase and maintenance of equipment.

For the first time, the latest white paper includes a separate section titled “Military Confidence-Building”, highlighting China’s engagement in strategic consultations and dialogues, confidence-building measures undertaken in border regions (agreements signed with India in 1993, 1996 and 2005 are mentioned), cooperation on maritime security, participation in regional security mechanisms and China’s military exchanges. Although this information is not entirely absent from previous white papers, it is presented comprehensively in the latest document.

What does the white paper on China’s National Defense 2010 ultimately imply? First, it suggests that China is increasingly confident of its economic and military strength, and foresees an international environment conducive to the growth of its tangible and intangible assets. Second, the emphasis on force projection capabilities along with the focus on China’s involvement in UN-mandated missions, its constructive role in regional security, as well as the designation of “maintaining world peace and stability” as a task of national defence, seem to indicate a willingness to undertake a leadership position in global affairs. Third, the document underlines the absolute leadership of the Party over the armed forces, clarifying any ambiguity that may have been perceived over the control of the people’s army, and highlighting the improvement of ideological and political qualities as the foundation for high-calibre military personnel. Fourth, special mention is made of the “Military Legal System”, underscoring the observance of international treaties and relevant laws of the PRC by China’s armed forces. Far from mitigating conflict, strengthening adherence to the laws of the PRC could well mean a clash with customary international law and be part of “legal warfare” advocated in China’s policy of “active defense”.

To paraphrase from the previous white paper, one can say that the fear is that China would be attaching more importance to supporting diplomatic struggles with military as well as economic means. Aimed at strengthening confidence through greater transparency, the white paper does not quite succeed in mitigating this perception.

Rukmani Gupta is Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. She is currently a Doctoral candidate at Jawaharlal Nehru University, where she is writing a dissertation on “Chinese Critiques of United States’ Hegemony, 2001-2009.” She is a recipient of the India-China Government scholarship, wherein she undertook language studies and research in Dalian, China for two years (2007 to 2009). Ms. Gupta is fluent in Mandarin and has traveled extensively in Mainland China and Taiwan. She was previously Research Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.

http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/WhitePaperonChinasNationalDefence2010_rgupta_010411

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)